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Abstract 
We investigate how resource orchestration influences performance within the ‘knowledge 
resource management’ approach by exploiting a novel database on the Italian Serie A top-
professional football league spanning from the 1960-61 up to the 1991-92 season. We find that 
the acquisition of experience via newcomers has a U-shaped non-monotonic relationship with 
performance. Furthermore, we find that releasing co-specialized employees has a positive 
moderating role within the relationship between team experience and performance by  suggesting 
that dismissing old routines positively influences the relationship between current routines and 
team’s performance.  
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1. Introduction 
In this study, we aim to investigate how resource orchestration (Helfat et al., 2007; Sirmon et al., 
2011) affects performance at the firm level in the context of decisions concerning the 
management of knowledge resources (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996; Conner & Prahalad, 
1996).  
The notion of resource orchestration1 constitutes a recent development in the broader area of 
resource-based studies (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). It focuses on how managerial decision 
making affects performance by means of decisions concerning resource management processes 
(Adner & Helfat, 2003; Helfat et al., 2007; Sirmon et al., 2011). In particular, Helfat et al. (2007) 
maintain that resource orchestration decisions address two broad areas, namely, search/selection 
and configuration/deployment. Accordingly, in this study, we investigate the different effects of 
resource orchestration in the context of knowledge resource management, and we focus on the 
first area of resource orchestration decisions, i.e., search/selection, with specific attention paid to 
the acquisition of new resources and the release of current resources. 
More precisely, we aim to explore whether the contribution of newly acquired knowledge 
resources, as a whole, depends on the industry-level experience of such resources. Previous 
research has posited that an individual’s experience is a relevant knowledge resource (Reagans, 
Argote, & Brooks, 2005; Huckman & Pisano, 2006) that is transferable across firms (Castanias & 
Helfat, 1991; Holcomb, Holmes, & Connelly, 2009); however, previous studies have not 
examined whether and how different levels of newcomers’ experience, as a whole, affect firm 
performance. Furthermore, we investigate whether the release of co-specialized employees’ tacit 
knowledge affects the focal unit’s performance. Although prior studies have maintained that 
inertia transforms routines into traps (Levintal & March, 1993), we investigate whether the 
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release of routines (i.e., co-specialized employees’ tacit knowledge) sustains (or hampers) firm 
performance. In particular, we investigate whether the release of co-specialized knowledge 
resources moderates the performance of current co-specialized employees. 
We argue that resource orchestration in the context of knowledge resource management deserves 
accurate research efforts because the renewal of such resources is unavoidable (sooner or later)2 
and is likely to produce important consequences for a firm’s most critical source of competitive 
advantage.  
To address the above issues, we conducted research in the context of “Serie A”, the Italian top-
level professional football league, from 1960 to 1992. Sports settings are particularly suited to 
management research (see Wolfe et al., 2005; Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012) because they 
frequently allow for the observation of phenomena of particular interest from the viewpoint of the 
orchestration of knowledge resources, such as the fit between a given strategy and the available 
knowledge resources (Wright, Smart & McMahan, 1995; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008; DiMinin 
et al., 2015); individual and collective skills and tacit knowledge (Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002; 
Shamsie & Mannor, 2013); resource management and value creation (Holcomb et al., 2009); 
knowledge resource bundling (Sirmon et al., 2008); knowledge resource acquisition and release 
(Moliterno & Wiersema, 2007); interorganizational co-mobility of knowledge resources 
(Campbell et al., 2014); performance comparisons (Moliterno et al., 2014); and resource 
complementarity (Ethiraj & Garg, 2012; Crocker & Eckardt, 2014). Furthermore, although 
football teams may differ in terms of size, age and historical relevance (from a sporting 
viewpoint), they share a common market for resources (factors) and a general environment.  
Our study makes the following contributions. First, we show empirically that new knowledge 
resource acquisition must be examined as a collective resource and not as a sum of individual 
resources. In particular, insofar as the acquisition of new knowledge resources is concerned, we 
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observed a non-monotonic relationship (i.e., a U-shaped relationship) that emphasizes the role of 
newly acquired knowledge as a collective resource. In addition, our study is (among) the first to 
explore the effect of released employees’ co-specialization on a team’s results. More precisely, 
we find a positive moderating role on the relationship between team experience and performance. 
This finding suggests that the dismissal of old routines positively influences the relationship 
between new routines and performance, thus shedding new light on an important interaction 
concerning the effectiveness of knowledge resources. 
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Recent research has clarified that resource-based studies require additional development insofar 
as resource management is concerned (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Sirmon, Gove & Hitt, 2007). 
Accordingly, we endeavor to investigate how resource orchestration (Hefalt et al., 2007; Sirmon 
et al., 2001) in the context of knowledge resource decisions addresses this issue with respect to 
search/selection decisions. In particular, we focus on those specific decisions concerning the 
acquisition of new resources in the form of new employees’ experience and the release of such 
resources in the form of the dismissal of co-specialized resources, and we examine the effect of 
both types of decisions on performance.  
 
2.1. The impact of new employees’ experience on performance  
Several studies have investigated the relevance of individuals’ experience (Castanias & Helfat, 
1991; Coff, 1999; Holcomb et al., 2009; Dokko, Wilk, & Rothbard, 2009) and its impact on 
firms’ results (Edmondson, Bhomer, & Pisano, 2001; Argote, McEvily, and Reagans, 2003; 
Reagans et al., 2005; Huckman et al., 2009). These studies3 unanimously conceive of an 
individual’s experience as a valuable resource in terms of its contribution to a unit’s results. 
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Individual experience has also been studied as a proxy for learning and tacit knowledge (Argote 
& Ingram, 2000; Huckman & Pisano, 2006; Shamsie & Mannor, 2013). In particular, such 
research has noted that although an individual’s experience is a critical asset, its effect is 
frequently contingent on routines and contextual knowledge rooted at the organizational level. 
Furthermore, a given individual’s experience has been examined from the viewpoint of human 
capital development (Lepak & Snell, 1999; Moliterno & Wiersema, 2007). For example, Lepak 
and Snell (1999) maintain that human capital experience can be appraised based on the degree of 
its development. More precisely, more seasoned and experienced individuals are valued as 
developed and ready-to-use resources whose contribution is expected to be fully productive in the 
short run. In Major League Baseball (MLB), Moliterno & Wiersema (2007) conceive of those 
individuals who had previously acquired substantial experience in the league as developed 
resources. In summary, research and studies on the contribution of an individual’s experience to 
firm performance have produced an articulated picture; however, they have neglected the role of 
resource orchestration, that is, the collective and shared effect of newly acquired knowledge 
resources (i.e., newcomers) beyond the effect of the single, newly acquired resource.  
To fill this void, we maintain that the orchestration choices regarding acquisitions must be 
observed with respect to the characteristics of newcomers not as if such individuals were stand-
alone assets but as if they were a whole, collective resource because, following Alchian & 
Demsetz (1972), the contribution of a group of individuals at the team level is more than the sum 
of the single contribution of those individuals to the team. This phenomenon occurs because 
complementarity among resources is likely to affect performance in a differentiated manner 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). Accordingly, we maintain that the level of experience among new 
knowledge resources is likely to affect performance in a differentiated fashion that particularly 
depends on their experience at the industry level. Individual experience at the industry level is a 
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relevant indicator of professional skills (Castanias and Helfat, 1991; Dokko et al., 2009). In 
contrast to other types of experience that are considered to be contextual and firm-specific, 
individual experience at the industry level is considered to be highly transferable across firms 
(Reagans et al., 2005; Holcomb et al., 2009). Although individual experience is transferable 
across firms, we do not know how different levels of collective knowledge resources might affect 
a new unit’s performance. Similarly, we have no empirical evidence regarding whether a group 
of new employees would affect the performance of their new employer in a differentiated fashion 
based on a given level of collective experience. Because the collective level of experience of new 
knowledge resources contributes to defining the resource strategy adopted by a given manager, 
we argue that it is important to examine whether and how such a strategy affects performance. To 
address this issue, we consider the collective experience of newcomers when such employees join 
a new firm and examine how different levels of newcomers’ experience affect the unit’s 
performance.  
The effects of newcomers on performance has produced contrasting results in the literature, 
although it has received increasing attention from managerial studies (Berman et al., 2002; Chen, 
2005; Groysberg et al., 2008; Groysberg and Lee, 2009; Rink et al., 2013; Campbell et al., 2014). 
The general – and somewhat surprising – conclusion shared by these studies is that, although 
some level of knowledge resource renewal is unavoidable, its effect will most likely be negative. 
For example, Berman et al. (2002) hypothesized a negative relationship with respect to the 
contribution of new players to performance. In addition, several other studies have found that 
new employers may experience some problems receiving newcomers and must develop specific 
integrative procedures to reduce the negative effects of newcomers’ presence and performance 
(Chen, 2005; Dokko et al., 2009). Furthermore, in studying the financial investment industry, 
Groysberg et al. (2008) observes that even highly skilled individuals suffer performance declines 
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upon joining new employers, and Groysberg and Lee (2009) report in an empirical study that 
such a decline also affects their new employer’s results. This finding is also consistent with 
theoretical developments in the collective turnover literature concerning, in particular, how 
newcomers’ firms-specific proficiency affects performance (Hausknecht and Holwerda, 2013). In 
sum, the literature seems to suggest that newcomers negatively impact firm performance, 
although there are contrasting views on this phenomenon.  
To overcome the contrasting results provided by the extant literature, we maintain that the 
relationship between new employees’ contribution and performance could be non-linear (i.e., U-
shaped), that is, first decreasing in the presence of low levels of new employees’ experience up to 
a certain point, and then subsequently, beyond this point, higher levels of new employees’ 
experience are amenable to exerting a positive effect on performance. In the remainder of this 
subsection, we clarify the motivation for this non-linear (U-shaped) relationship. 
A low level of new employees’ experience (i.e., a few individuals characterized by low 
experience) is amenable to producing a decreasing effect on performance because the presence of 
less experienced newcomers is likely to create uncertainty among the current teammates because 
such resources are less trained compared with their more experienced colleagues (Lepak and 
Snell, 1999) and because a low level of experience will sometimes lead to mistakes (Weick, 
1993). In addition, the current teammates are unsure of exactly what the newcomers know (lack 
of relationship knowledge – Reagans, Argote and Brooks, 2005); therefore, they suffer from 
uncertainty while executing established routines. Furthermore, it is likely that a small number of 
newcomers characterized by low knowledge and understanding of the unit’s current routines will 
require some time before they become integrated team members; therefore, we expect that their 
utilization will produce decreasing results up to a certain level of new employees’ experience. 
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However, beyond this level of new employees’ experience, we expect that their presence at the 
unit level is likely to produce increasing results because it will be associated with the substantial 
presence of more experienced individuals. Highly experienced knowledge resources are likely to 
offer a ready-to-use skill set that is easily exploitable at the firm level (Lepak and Snell, 1999) 
because highly experienced individuals have the readiness and motivation of developed human 
capital and thus are able to provide their best contribution over the short term (Argote and 
Ingram, 2000; Tucker, Nembhard, and Edmondson, 2007; Huckman et al., 2009). More precisely, 
their contribution takes the form of a set of ready-to-use skills that enlarges their new firm’s 
repository of knowledge and, at the same time, broadens the new unit’s repertoire of behaviors 
and actions, thus making its conduct more innovative and less predictable. Furthermore, because 
they are experienced individuals, their current teammates know what they know; thus, there is no 
uncertainty with regard to their relationship knowledge. Therefore, thanks to the experience of 
the new employees, the new unit will be able to effectively address an increased number of 
environmental conditions and face competitors with increased competitiveness. We therefore 
maintain that, beyond a certain level, higher levels of new employees’ experience are likely to 
render the firm more competitive and innovative – and less predictable – and that such 
occurrences positively affect its performance. These considerations lead us to the following 
hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: There is a non-monotonic (U-shaped) relationship between the experience of 
new employees and performance. More precisely, lower levels of new employees’ experience 
are likely to produce decreasing results up until a given point; however, beyond this point, 
higher levels of new employees’ experience are likely to produce an increasing effect on 
performance.  
 
2.2 The effect of released employees’ co-specialization on performance 
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Knowledge resource renewal is unavoidable for many firms that are driven by demographic, 
mobility and competitive considerations (Coff, 1999; Lepak and Snell, 1999), which implies that 
firms recurrently release a given amount of co-specialized employees. Because such releases 
include a portion of the firms’ co-specialized knowledge and shared experience (Wezel, Cattani, 
and Pennings, 2006; Aime et al., 2010), it seems important to investigate whether they might 
prove detrimental to the firm’s performance.  
The strategic management and organizational theory streams of literature have devoted 
substantial attention to the analysis of shared experience and co-specialized tacit knowledge 
(herein, co-specialization) at the firm level (Katz, 1982; Berman et al., 2002; Reagans et al., 
2005; Huckman et al., 2009; Shamsie and Mannor, 2013). Some of these studies empirically 
observe a non-monotonic (i.e., inverted U-shaped) effect of co-specialization on performance 
(Katz, 1982; Berman et al., 2002), which implies that, beyond a certain level of shared 
experience, a firm becomes predictable and its knowledge ossified. Other studies have instead 
maintained and empirically found a linear relationship between employees’ co-specialization and 
performance (Reagans et al., 2005; Huckman et al., 2009; Huesch, 2013). For example, in the 
context of healthcare, both Reagans et al. (2005) and Huesch (2013) find a positive relationship 
between the degree of co-specialization and operating- and caring-team and performance; 
similarly, Huckman et al. (2009) observe a positive effect for co-specialization (i.e., team 
familiarity) on performance in the software industry. In addition, Shamsie and Mannor 
(2013:516) refer to co-specialization by distinguishing between discrete and linked productive 
tacit knowledge; the former connotes the tacit knowledge related to a specific task held by 
individuals, whereas the latter (i.e., co-specialization) “refers to the application of the knowledge 
of the larger group to the performance of the same task or activity.” All of the above studies 
concur in emphasizing the critical role of co-specialization held at the collective level and 
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socially embedded within an organization. Furthermore, the empirical evidence reported above 
almost unanimously – with a few exceptions, such as Berman et al. (2002) – finds that co-
specialization positively affects performance with no decreasing effects due to either inertia or 
ossification.  
However, while remarking about the relevance of co-specialized tacit knowledge and its effect on 
performance, the previous literature has not probed into the inverse phenomenon (that is, what 
happens when such co-specialized tacit knowledge is subtracted from a given unit). The critical 
issue is that the collective tacit knowledge stemming from individuals’ mutual co-specialization 
is not simply the sum of the individuals’ tacit knowledge (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Kogut and 
Zander, 1992); in addition, the release of co-specialized employees subtracts a part of the focal 
unit’s functioning mechanism (Reagans et al., 2005). These studies lead us to consider that once a 
portion of co-specialized knowledge is subtracted from a given team or unit, the remaining part 
of that team’s processes will be somewhat hampered and its performance negatively affected. For 
example, studies on the cognitive nature of routines emphasize the holistic nature of the 
interrelations among individuals when they are executing routinized tasks (Weick and Roberts, 
1993). These findings imply that the release of a portion of such interrelations from the unit’s 
collective mind (Weick and Roberts, 1993) is equal to subtracting a portion of the instructions 
from an information system: the system likely either ceases to function or works only partially. A 
similar concern is also shared by studies that investigate collective turnover (Hausknecht and 
Trevor, 2011; Nyberg and Ployhart, 2013).  
Furthermore, studies on collective experience and learning maintain that firms can be conceived 
of as networks of people; within these networks, individuals know whom to contact about 
specific issues and the precise competence of their co-workers (Huckman and Pisano, 2006; 
Groysberg, Lee, and Nanda, 2008). For example, Pisano, Bohmer, and Edmondson (2001) find 
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that effective surgical teams need minimum verbal communication because their interactions and 
repeated cooperation provide the basis for a type of communication that is largely based on tacit 
knowledge. Likewise, Huckman and Pisano (2006) emphasize the complementarity existing 
among team members’ tacit knowledge and argue that such complementarity might be dissipated 
if the composition of the team is changed. Indeed, given the contingent nature of collective co-
specialized knowledge, when the current members of a given unit no longer work with their 
former (i.e., released) teammates, it is likely that their performance will be uncertain (Huckman 
and Pisano, 2006). This finding is consistent with Reagans et al. (2005: 871), who maintain that 
the experience of other team members constitutes a “pool of knowledge at an individual’s 
disposal that is distinct from the knowledge he or she has accumulated directly”, and with Ethiraj 
and Garg (2012), who empirically find in the context of the National Basketball Association 
(NBA) that greater interaction among team members fosters learning, knowledge sharing and 
communication.  
Therefore, when some teammates leave their former team, a subtraction process occurs such that 
the continuity of the team’s functioning mechanisms is hampered, and its performance is likely to 
worsen. This subtraction of internal guideposts may engender a sense of uncertainty among 
current teammates, who no longer feel comfortable executing previously routinized tasks (Audia 
and Greve, 2006). As a result, the team as a whole might experience a lack of sense-making and 
orientation (Weick, 1993), which is frequently associated with negative performance 
(Edmondson et al., 2001).  
However, the extant literature notwithstanding, we maintain that the release of co-specialized 
employees may also positively affect performance through its moderating effect on the 
relationship between team co-specialization and performance. More precisely, we argue that 
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released employees’ co-specialization may positively influence a firm’s processes because it 
enables an organization to explore innovative paths and counter inertia.  
The extant research has deeply investigated the role of inertia in the failure of firms threatened by 
discontinuous change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000). Subsequent studies have addressed this issue from the perspective of routine 
adaptation to change (Pisano, Bohmer, and Edmondson, 2001; Gilbert, 2005) and maintain that 
successful firms are those that add new competences and knowledge to their existing patterned 
and routinized set of procedures. In summary, the extant literature maintains that routines 
constitute a double-edged sword; on the one hand, they have positive effects because they are the 
coordinating mechanism of an organization (i.e., the collective mind: Weick and Roberts, 1993); 
on the other hand, routines represent both a source of inertia and of failure for incumbent firms 
confronting either competitive or technological discontinuities (Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).  
Therefore, it seems relevant to investigate whether the partial or substantial release of routines 
may positively affect firms and their performance, which is also consistent with studies that 
espouse the beneficial effects of forgetting for a given organization (Levinthal and March, 1993; 
Pisano et al., 2001). However, the scholars that have empirically explored such phenomena (i.e., 
Gilbert, 2005; Tucker et al., 2007) have paid scant attention to the effect that the release of extant 
and redundant knowledge may have on the performance of the renewed unit. In particular, 
Gilbert (2005) emphasizes the mechanisms that enable routine relaxation, such as psychological 
safety; however, he does not adequately investigate whether a substantial release of current 
routines (i.e., routines associated with traditional media management) would help to address the 
threat represented by the internet to newspapers and the traditional media industry. Likewise, 
Tucker et al. (2007) examine the processes underlying effective best-practice transfers in neonatal 
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intensive care settings, but they do not investigate whether the previous best practices were 
abandoned or maintained along with newly developed best practices.  
Thus, to fill this void, we explore the role of released co-specialization as a type of enabling 
condition at the firm level, such that when (and the extent to which) a unit is deprived of existing 
routines, it is likely that it will produce new co-specialized knowledge. Previous research has 
found that routines are resistant to change (Gersick and Hackman, 1990; Edmondson et al., 
2001); however, these studies have not investigated whether the release of a portion of an 
existing routine may prove beneficial to the performance of a new routine. We argue that this 
issue is quite salient because current routines may hamper the execution of new tasks. As 
reported by Edmondson et al. (2001: 687), “The design of a commercial aircraft’s cockpit is 
conducive to certain standard of operating procedures for take-off and landing. The strength of 
this correspondence can lull teams into executing well-known routines even when external stimuli 
vary. For example, accustomed to uniformly warm weather, an Air Florida pilot automatically 
responded in the affirmative to his team member’s routine question, ‘Anti-ice off?’, despite the 
heavy snowfall at Washington, D. C.’s National Airport during the January 1982 takeoff. 
Tragically, this inappropriate adherence to routine led to the flight’s crash…killing all 74 crew 
members and passengers (Gersick and Hackman, 1990). ” 
Therefore, we maintain that the release of co-specialized knowledge may have beneficial results 
for the development and execution of new routines because familiarity among team members 
frequently leads to the execution of behaviors in situations in which they are inappropriate or no 
longer adequate. Research on errors in medicine and other contexts reinforces this view (Reason, 
1984; Edmondson et al., 2001).  
(R1/1) Moreover, with regard to team members’ experience, we also posit that current co-
specialized knowledge and routines are only partially related to a unit member’s age because 
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individuals may join a given unit at a green age and work the for the unit for a given number of 
years before leaving the unit when he/she is still relatively young (according to the industry 
standard). In other words, our focus is not on the replacement of experienced individuals per se. 
This issue also invites further consideration regarding the inherent quality of current vs new 
routines. In particular, in this study, we are agnostic about the comparison between new and old 
routines on a purely observable quality basis. Our purpose is simply to probe whether old 
routines – although valuable – are bound to be predictable by competitors such that, also because 
of inertia and ossification (Berman, et al., 2002), they are not likely to contribute positively to 
performance beyond a certain point in time. Therefore, we endeavor to investigate whether their 
dismissal might be beneficial to the performance of the new routine (R1/1). 
In summary, we argue that when an organization is lightened from the redundancy and inertia of 
extant co-specialized knowledge, new processes can occur and new routines can develop. Thus, 
we maintain that enabling new resources, routines and procedures to create a positive effect on 
performance will be helped by a substantial lightening process regarding the release of prior 
resources, routines and procedures. In particular, this process will occur by releasing either a 
smaller or a more substantial portion of the co-specialized knowledge at the unit level. Therefore, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The release of employees’ co-specialization positively moderates the 
relationship between team co-specialization and performance.  
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Settings 
 The Italian “Serie A” professional soccer league represents a competitive context that is similar 
to several business settings. In the Italian “Serie A”, resource orchestration decisions regarding 
15 
 
search/selection are carried out by a team’s owner (Presidente). The owner sets the team’s 
strategy: he hires the coach and selects a roster of players. The team’s coach acts at a lower 
decisional level than the owner. The coach is in charge of training the players and is responsible 
for bundling the starting line-up, although he is not in charge of players’ acquisition and release 
(Brera, 1975; Foot, 2007; Sconcerti, 2009). During the period covered by our research, a win 
accrued two points, a tie (or net) accrued one point and a loss accrued zero points. Because of the 
extreme popularity of and endemic passion for football  across virtually every tier of Italian 
society (Brera, 1975; Foot, 2007; Sconcerti, 2009), leading a football club in the Italian “Serie A” 
is a highly demanding task. Furthermore, at the end of every season, there are many player trades 
among virtually all of the teams. In addition, daily widespread media coverage by three sports-
dedicated newspapers (i.e., Gazzetta dello Sport, Corriere dello Sport, and Tuttosport) – in 
addition to the sports section of every national and regional newspaper – puts coaches, 
management and players under a magnifying glass. These features make the “Serie A” a highly 
appropriate setting for exploring our resource orchestration argument.  
3.2 Sample and Data 
We collected data on a game-day basis between the 1960-61 and 1991-92 seasons. We gathered 
our data from two main sources: the “Enciclopedia Panini del Calcio Italiano, 1960-2000” and 
the “Almanacco Illustrato del Calcio” (years: 1960-1992). Both sources are published by Panini, 
which is widely considered to be the most authoritative and accurate source of information about 
Italian football. Additionally, we explored several issues from the 1960-1992 archives of 
Gazzetta dello Sport, which is the oldest and most widely distributed sports newspaper in Italy. 
We also interviewed several experts, and we explored the database of the Rec. Sport Soccer 
Statistics Foundation (RSSSF) database.  
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Our sample consists of data regarding players, coaches and team performances from the 1960-61 
through the 1991-92 seasons. Because our unit of analysis is the football team, data on players 
and coaches are used to construct measures at the team level. Taking into account changes in the 
composition of the Serie A team list over the years (i.e., teams upgrade from and downgrade to 
Serie B during our sample period), there are a total of 43 teams in the dataset (Appendix A 
reports the complete list of the teams included in our research). In particular, from the 1960-61 
through the 1966-67 seasons and from the 1988-89 through the 1991-92 seasons, 18 teams played 
in the Serie A, whereas from the 1967-68 through the 1987-88 seasons, only 16 teams played in 
the league. Therefore, our sample contains 534 team-year observations across 32 years (i.e., 
football seasons). Furthermore, the Italian Serie A league has no playoff rounds at the end of the 
season; thus, every year, several teams typically compete until the last game day not only for the 
final win for the championship but also for positions in the final standings that qualify for 
participation in the major European tournaments. In addition, because teams at the bottom of the 
standings (i.e., three or four, depending on the number of teams composing Serie A that year) are 
relegated to Serie B at the end of the year, a number of mid-to-low level teams struggle fiercely 
through the last game to avoid relegation. Therefore, as opposed to data collected in sports 
settings in which the final win is achieved through playoffs and in which many games at the end 
of the regular season are thus essentially useless, our dataset does not include many such useless 
games because team-to-team competition in Serie A remains alive for virtually every single 
football match until the final game day.  
3.3 Variables 
Dependent variable.  
Team performance. The dependent variable in our study is team performance, which is measured 
by mean points at the end of each season (the annual team data). Indeed, because a win was 
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worth two points, a tie was worth one point, and a loss was worth zero points in the “Serie A” 
league during the time window of our research, we summed both wins and ties and divided this 
amount by the total number of games in the season. This measurement is similar to measures of 
performance utilized by other studies exploring sports settings (e.g., Berman et al., 2002; 
Holcomb et al., 2009). Previous research in sports settings has considered the ability to gain 
points in direct competition to be a highly qualified and straightforward measure of 
organizational performance (Berman et al., 2002; Sirmon et al., 2008; Holcomb et al., 2009).  
Independent Variables 
New employees’ experience. We calculated this variable as follows. First, we summed the games 
played in the careers by new players on the roster through the previous season. Subsequently, we 
divided this sum by the number of new players on the roster. Finally, we calculated the natural 
logarithm of this indicator.  
New employees’ experience squared. This variable is “New employees’ experience” squared and 
allows for the investigation of the curvilinear relationship that we hypothesized.  
Released employees’ co-specialization. We adopt Reagans et al.’s (2005) measure for assessing 
co-specialization. For each pair of players on a team, we first consider the number of times that 
they have been bundled together in a given season. Next, we sum across pairs on a team that 
includes at least one released player and divide by team size. The formula is ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑗/𝑁𝑗=1
𝑅
𝑖=1
𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2. CKij is the number of times that player i (i.e., the released player) has been 
bundled with player j (whether that player was a released player or he remained on the team), 
which we define as the co-specialized knowledge resources at the pair level, where R is the 
number of released players at the end of the season and N is team size. This measure gauges the 
amount of co-specialized knowledge developed during the previous season and then released at 
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the beginning of the current season. Other studies have adopted this measure in the context of the 
software industry (Huckman et al., 2009) and the NBA (Ethiraj and Garg, 2012). 
Team-level co-specialization. Similarly, we adopt Reagans et al.’s (2005) measure for team-level 
co-specialization. In particular, we assess how many times each pair of players has been bundled 
for a given game during the current season; the formula we use is ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑗/𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/𝑁𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
2. CKij is the number of times that player i has been bundled with player j, which we define as 
the co-specialized knowledge resources at the pair level; N is team size. Here, we compute the 
formula for all of the players on each roster, which allows us to calculate co-specialization among 
all players at the team level.  
Control variables 
Lagged team performance. This variable represents the previous year’s team performance lagged 
to the current year.  
Historic aspiration level. Following the procedure adopted by the performance feedback 
literature, we constructed each team’s historic aspiration level (HAL). In particular, by using the 
final rank at the end of a given season, we constructed the exponential weighted moving average 
employed by Levinthal and March (1981): HALt = α Final Rankt-1 + (1- α) HAL t-1 , 
with t indicating football seasons. Following the extant literature, we constructed this variable 
with values of α set at 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 (Baum, 2005; Moliterno et al., 2014). We opted for 
α=0.25 because it had the best fit throughout our models and also because a small value of α has 
face validity in the context of our study, as we do not wish to overemphasize the most recent 
occurrences in the context of choices concerning knowledge resource selection and release. 
Team quality. To gauge this variable, we begin by considering the quality of a team’s players at 
the individual level (i.e., at the single-player level). First, we count the number of games played 
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by a given player during each season, then we multiply that amount by the team’s total points at 
the end of that season, and finally, we divide that number by the player’s age. Subsequently, we 
calculated the average player quality for the whole “Serie A” league; finally, we counted for each 
team the number of players whose quality result was above the “Serie A” average. We provide 
the rationale for this measure in the following. Because Italian football is a tremendously 
selective and competitive setting, it is difficult for a “Serie A” player to be in the starting lineup 
continuously (Brera, 1975; Sconcerti, 2009). Therefore, a player who plays a high number of 
games per season is a highly qualified professional player. Furthermore, drawing on studies 
addressing the contribution of human capital to performance, which take into account work 
experience weighted by the quality of the employer and other features of human capital 
(Huckman and Pisano, 2006; Ployhart and Moliterno, 2011), a player on a “Serie A” top-ranked 
team must be considered of higher quality compared with a player on a lower-level team. Finally, 
we consider that even the quality of highly qualified players decreases due to age. We count this 
value per year, not including the current season. In addition, we carried out validation procedures. 
We apply this measure to gauge the quality of each new player, and then we calculate the mean 
value of the new players’ quality. To validate our measure, we explored bibliographic sources 
(Brera, 1975; Foot, 2007; Sconcerti, 2009) and sports newspaper archives (Gazzetta dello Sport): 
their reports are consistent with our results and confirm that our ranking of football players is an 
accurate ranking of the best athletes in the time window of our research, especially with regard to 
the top players in our quality ranking (Appendix B). For example, Gianni Rivera (#1 in our 
ranking) was the first Italian player to win the Golden Football as the best European player, in 
1969. Giacinto Facchetti (#2 in our ranking) and Tarcisio Burgnich (#3 in our ranking) were, in 
the time window of our research, by far the best pair of terzini (side-backs). Dino Zoff (#5 in our 
ranking) is considered one the best goalkeepers in the history of world football, not only of 
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Italian football. Mario Corso (#4 in our ranking) and Sandro Mazzola (#6 in our ranking) were 
the leading forwards of the Grande Inter (Great Inter), a team that dominated Italian and 
European Football in the 1960s. Furthermore, our ranking is highly correlated with the ranking of 
the presence on Italy’s national team for the time window of our research, which constitutes a 
very compelling corroboration of our measure, given that only the best players have the chance to 
be selected for the national team. In Appendix B, we provide an example of how this variable 
was calculated and report the validation procedures.  
Released employees’ quality. This variable is calculated following the procedure that is reported 
above for the variable “Employees’ quality”, but it only refers to the mean quality of released 
players, i.e., those players who were dismissed at the end of the previous season.  
New coach. This is a dummy variable and takes the value of “1” if a given team in our dataset 
hired a new coach for that season and “0” otherwise.  
Coach’s absolute experience. This variable is the total number of seasons that a given coach has 
been in the “Serie A” league. 
 
3.4 Model specification 
We employed panel data analysis to test our hypotheses. (R2/1) The observation unit is the team-
year. In our sample, we have data from 1960 to 1992, for a total of 32 years (seasons) and 43 
teams. By exploiting the longitudinal nature of the data (both time series and cross section), we 
control for both unobserved heterogeneity and the impact of lagged dependent variables.  
3.4.1 Panel model specification 
We include team fixed effects that control for time-invariant omitted variables at the level of each 
sporting team (for example, location and date of incorporation, among many others). We also 
need to control for time dummies to account for common effects to all teams in a specific year. 
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We test the ideal lag structure and decided to opt for two lags of the dependent variable as a 
predicting variable on the right-hand side to account for a very well-known effect of persistent 
team performance over time (years): a strong (weak) team in one year tends to be strong (weak) 
in later years. In addition, we add ten weakly exogenous regressors to test our hypotheses. 
However, because endogeneity is also a potential concern for these regressors (for example, the 
average quality of a team could be determined by its results in previous years), the independent 
variables (x1 to x10) are lagged, which implies that those independent variables are at least not 
determined simultaneously with the dependent variable. The baseline model is therefore specified 
as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
3 + 𝛽4𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
4 + 𝛽5𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
5 + 𝛽6𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
6
+ 𝛽7𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
7 + 𝛽8𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
8 + 𝛽9𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
9 + 𝛽10𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
10 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where yit is the dependent variable, i.e., the average number of points during a year, x
1
it-1 is the 
dummy for a new coach, x2it-1 is the coach’s absolute experience in the “Serie” A football league, 
x3it-1 is the historic aspiration level, x
4
it-1 is team quality, x
5
it-1 is the average quality of released 
players, x6it-1 is the experience of new employees, x
7
it-1 is the square of new employees’ 
experience, x8it-1 is released employees’ co-specialization, x9it-1 is team-level co-specialization, 
x10it-1 is the interaction between released employees’ co-specialization and team-level co-
specialization, vi is team fixed effects, nt are time dummies and finally, eit is the error term. 
To ascertain whether team effects are random or fixed, preliminarily, we run a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test (Hausman specification test), which allows us to confirm the need for fixed effects 
(vis-à-vis random effects) at the team level. Furthermore, to correct for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation, we cluster the standard errors (Stock and Watson, 2003). This procedure is based 
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on the concept of the cluster-robust covariance matrix (VCE command in STATA), which 
relaxes the assumption of independent errors and allows for correlation between errors within 
clusters of observations. Thus, this procedure specifies that the standard errors allow for 
intragroup/cluster correlation, and it relaxes the usual requirement that the observations must be 
independent within teams. In other words, the observations are independent across groups 
(clusters), but not necessarily within groups. Table 2 reports the results of this model.  
3.4.2 GMM panel model specification as a system  
When introducing two lagged dependent variables in the previous panel model, we had to 
account for the fact that 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2  are correlated with the error term. For this reason, the 
estimated coefficients (Table 2) might be biased due to endogeneity. For a robustness check, we 
re-run the entire set of regressions in a dynamic panel data setting. Specifically, we use a 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model (STATA xtabond2) to mitigate the potential 
endogeneity problem. More precisely, the GMM model is a system of equations specified in the 
following way: 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜋∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽1∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
1 + 𝛽2∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽3∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
3 + 𝛽4∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
4 + 𝛽5∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
5
+ 𝛽6∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
6 + 𝛽7∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
7 + 𝛽8∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
8 + 𝛽9∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
9 + 𝛽10∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
10 + 𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
3 + 𝛽4𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
4 + 𝛽5𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
5 + 𝛽6𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
6
+ 𝛽7𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
7 + 𝛽8𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
8 + 𝛽9𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
9 + 𝛽10𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
10 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
The GMM “difference equation” controls for unobserved heterogeneity (the vi are cancelled out), 
and the level equation corrects for endogeneity and improves the efficiency by exploiting the 
instruments for the two lagged variables. Table 3 reports the results of this model accounting for 
endogeneity.  
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4. Results 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and the correlation analysis. Table 2 (Models 1-4) 
presents the results of the regression analysis. Table 3 (Models 1-4) presents the results of the 
regression dynamic panel data analysis controlling for endogeneity.  
- - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Insert Table 2 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
(R2/2) Model 1 reports a baseline with controls. First, we tested Hypothesis 1, which proposes a 
curvilinear relationship between the experience of new knowledge resources (i.e., new 
employees) and performance. Model 2 tested the full model for our first hypothesis. Our findings 
support Hypothesis 1 because the impact of employees’ experience on performance is shown to 
be non-monotonic and significant (Model 2, Table 2: New employees’ mean experience: b= -
0.126, p<0. 05; and New employees’ mean experience squared: b=0. 0254, p<0. 001). To 
appraise the actual shape of the hypothesized relationship (that is, whether our findings supported 
a U-shaped relationship, or, instead, just a non-linear decreasing effect), we conducted a further 
analysis on the non-monotonic function that allowed us to confirm Hypothesis 1. Our additional 
analysis supported the actual U-shaped relationship between “New employees’ mean experience” 
and performance. 
More precisely, to investigate this relationship, we examine the first-order partial derivatives of 
performance with respect to new employees’ mean experience (Model 2, Table 2). Subsequently, 
we set the equation equal to zero and solved for new employees’ mean experience.  
Then, we have: 
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Model 2:Team Performance= 0.514 - 0.126 new employees’ experience + 0.0254 new 
employees’ experience squared. 
Because new employees’ experience is the natural of the new employees’ mean experience, to 
solve the equation, we set new employees’ experience= Z and new employees’ experience 
squared= 𝑍2   
 
Thus, Model 2: Team Performance= 0.514 - 0.126 Z +0.0254 𝑍2 
Model 2: ∂Performance/∂Z=2*0.0254 *Z-0.126=0; thus, Z=2.48 
This value (i.e., 2.48) represents the point beyond which an increasing effect of new employees’ 
experience on performance actually occurs. It is comprised within the range of our observations 
(Table 1), as the value of new employees’ mean experience varies between -1.79 (min) and 5.30 
(max), with the mean value equal to 3.31 and the standard deviation equal to 0.94. Thus, we 
found support for our Hypothesis 1. More precisely, an increase in the value of the experience of 
new employees negatively affects performance up to a value equal to 2.48, and beyond this value, 
an increase in the value of new employees’ mean experience positively affects performance. 
Taking into account that the value is the natural logarithm of new employees’ mean experience, 
we calculate the inverse function:  
New employees’ experience= 𝑒𝑍= > New employees’ experience= 𝑒2.48= 11.94 
 
Thus, we can argue that because this variable varies between 0 (min) and 200.3333 (max), with a 
mean value equal to 35.83762 and a standard deviation equal to 28.7041, the value 11.94 is the 
point beyond which we observed an increasing effect of the variable and a non-monotonic, i.e., 
U-shaped, relationship. More precisely, we observed that approximately 21.39% of our 
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observations are in the downward portion of the parabola, while the remaining portion of the 
observations are on the upward side of the parabola.  
This finding allows us to observe that the contribution of new knowledge resources to 
performance must be observed by considering such resources as a whole and not as if they were 
stand-alone assets. Furthermore, it allows us to appraise the impact of orchestration on 
performance because we empirically gauged that the experience of newcomers affects 
performance through a non-monotonic relationship (i.e., U-shaped), which implies that a manager 
must pay attention not only to the experience of the individual knowledge resources that he is 
acquiring but also to the collective experience that he is bringing into the unit; importantly, it is 
this collective level of expertise that will be added to the given unit. By empirically observing a 
non-monotonic relationship (i.e., U-shaped) between newcomers’ experience and performance, 
we thus illustrate how orchestration choices affect a firm’s results. More precisely, our study 
suggests that such choices are successful when they bring a clear choice into the unit in terms of a 
substantial new amount of experience through the newly acquired players. This evidence 
represents a fruitful contribution to the resource orchestration literature because, in contrast to 
both studies that emphasize the relevance of individual experience (Coff, 1999; Huckman et al., 
2009) and those that maintain different effects for high and low levels of experience on 
performance (Lepak and Snell, 1999; Reagans et al., 2005; Huckman et al., 2009), we find that 
only a substantial level of experience (i.e., beyond a given amount, as maintained by the U-
shaped relationship) among newcomers can positively affect performance. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the release of employees’ co-specialization would positively 
moderate the relationship between a team’s co-specialization and its performance and that the 
relationship would become stronger when the release of employees’ co-specialization was 
higher. The interaction between the release of employees’ co-specialization and a team’s co-
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specialization was shown to be significant (Model 3, Table 2: b=0. 000834, p<0. 1). However, 
the value of the coefficient was not very high; therefore, we can conclude that we observed a 
positive and significant result, although at a lower level. In particular, this finding addresses the 
subtraction of co-specialization from a given unit. Although the extant literature has noted the 
relevance of knowledge resource co-specialization and its positive effect on performance 
(Reagans et al., 2005; Huckman et al., 2009; Huesch, 2013), it has not probed the opposite 
relationship – specifically, what occurs when co-specialization is subtracted from a given unit. 
However, we found that, conversely, the release of co-specialized employees has a positive effect 
on performance; in particular, we observed that the release of co-specialized employees 
positively moderates the relationship between team co-specialization and performance. 
Furthermore, this finding is quite relevant because the extant literature (i.e., Gilbert, 2005; Tucker 
et al., 2007) has almost completely neglected the role played by subtracting old routines in the 
performance of new routines. Indeed, by observing the positive moderating effect of released 
players’ co-specialization on the relationship between team co-specialization and performance, 
we observed that a given unit requires a lightening of the burden of previous learning before it 
can effectively exploit its new knowledge. This result is insightful because it reports the fruitful 
interplay between different resource orchestration decisions (i.e., between the release of co-
specialization and the newly acquired co-specialized resources). More precisely, we observed that 
the dismissal of old routines is beneficial to the development of new routines. In other words, 
before new insight and knowledge can fruitfully be exploited, a firm must be relieved of the 
burden of redundant and less useful knowledge represented by old-timers’ co-specialization. 
(R2/2) 
(R2/3) Finally, to corroborate our results, we conducted further analyses to rule out potential 
endogenous relationships. Table 3 reports the results corrected for endogeneity. 
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- - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table 3 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
To this end, we have specified a two lags dynamic panel model via a GMM estimation model 
(Baum et al., 2003), and we do find confirmation for both Hypothesis 1 (Model 2, Table3) and 
Hypothesis 2 (Model 3, Table3). To assess the validity of our GMM estimation, we run 
diagnostic tests for the following: 
(1) the presence of first-order autocorrelation AR(1): we correctly reject the null and confidently 
exclude the presence of first-order autocorrelation; 
(2) the presence of second-order autocorrelation AR(2): we cannot reject the null, and we find the 
presence of second-order autocorrelation (as per construction in GMM); 
(3) the Hansen test on over-identifying restrictions: we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
over-identifying restrictions are valid; therefore, we conclude that the estimates corrected for 
endogeneity are valid. 
We therefore conclude that the results of our dynamic model are robust, and our main and 
foremost hypotheses are indeed confirmed. (R2/3) 
 
5. Discussion 
The foregoing results paint an interesting picture regarding the consequences of resource 
orchestration decisions on firm performance. In particular, we observed that newcomers’ 
experience affects firm performance through a curvilinear (i.e., U-shaped) relationship – as 
demonstrated by the empirical support provided for Hypothesis 1 – and that the release of co-
specialized employees has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between team co-
specialization and performance, as evidenced by the empirical support offered for Hypothesis 2. 
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On the basis of these findings, our study makes several contributions and opens up interesting 
directions for future research. 
First, we provide an insightful contribution to the resource orchestration literature (Helfat et al., 
2007; Sirmon et al., 2011). More precisely, on the basis of our first finding, we argue that a given 
manager should be able to orchestrate new knowledge resource acquisition at the unit level and 
select the most appropriate level of newcomer acquisition depending on their experience. This 
finding further contributes to the literature on resource orchestration, particularly regarding 
resource complementarity (Ehtiraj &Garg, 2012; Crocker & Eckardt, 2014), by empirically 
showing the types of resources that are appropriate to acquire at the firm level and by 
theoretically maintaining that effective complementarity can be designed. Furthermore, with 
respect to the collective dimension of resource utilization, our findings address a specific research 
void in the resource orchestration and configuration literature (Denrell, Fang & Winter, 2003; 
Helfat, 2007) because we have empirically observed what types of resources must be dismissed 
and what other resources must be recruited to orchestrate a successful resource configuration. 
Thus, we empirically showed how effective complementarity can be designed and, subsequently, 
achieved. 
Our second contribution addresses the need for further research efforts suggested by studies on 
human capital combination. Indeed, the decision to release co-specialized players, although it 
may exert a negative direct effect on performance, is also amenable to producing an indirect 
positive effect. Therefore, a manager who has a mid-to-long-term orientation regarding the unit’s 
results must account for this possibility, given that he must be interested in the team’s current 
results, but not to the detriment of the unit’s future survival. We argue that this finding also 
positively contributes to the development of research on resource orchestration. Additionally, by 
addressing the double effect of the release of co-specialized employees, we have also explored 
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some issues raised in the collective turnover literature (Hausknecht and Trevor, 2011; Nyberg 
and Ployhart, 2013). More precisely, by empirically observing that the substitution of a group of 
veterans positively moderates the relationship between a team’s current resource bundle and 
performance, we address a critical issue from both the orchestration and the collective turnover 
literature because we have clarified that resource orchestration can be extended to resource 
divestment, not only with respect to single resources but also regarding the replacement of a 
bundle of resources. 
 (R1/2) Our study also opens up a fruitful dialogue with other streams of literature for potential 
research extensions. One of these streams concerns the Leader-Member exchange (LMX) 
literature (Foa & Foa, 1974; Schwind Wilson, Sin, & Conlon, 2010). More precisely, it would be 
quite relevant to assess whether the substitution of leading players (i.e., a leading team member) 
affects resource exchanges and, in turn, firms’ performance. Although this extension would 
redirect research toward the relevance of individual knowledge resources, whereas our study aims 
instead to emphasize collective knowledge resources, it would nonetheless be important to 
control for this effect on both resource exchanges and firms’ results. We argue that the cross-
contamination between the resource orchestration and LMX theories would enrich managerial 
decision making, especially with regard to the exploitation of valuable knowledge resources, both 
at the individual and collective levels. 
Another intriguing extension concerns the Institutional Entrepreneurship literature (DiMaggio, 
1988; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). More precisely, by observing how leading firms/teams 
contribute to changing extant knowledge resource practices and rules in their industry/setting, we 
could observe how resource orchestration contributes to redefining and redesigning the rules of 
the game. For example, in the context of several major European football leagues, some teams 
such as the Spain’s Real Madrid and Barcelona, England’s Manchester United, Manchester City 
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and Chelsea and Germany’s Bayern Munchen heavily invested in high-quality and experienced 
players to increase their financial returns from both game tickets and merchandising, thus 
impairing competitors and gaining a sustainable competitive advantage (Szymanski, 2015). From 
the viewpoint of the dialogue between resource orchestration and institutional entrepreneurship, it 
is particularly relevant to consider how this new resource strategy affected not only the leagues in 
which these teams compete but the whole European football environment, given that the leading 
European institution for football, UEFA (Union of European Football Associations), recently 
implemented a regulation for teams whose spending budget substantially exceeded their revenue 
(i.e., the so called Financial Fair Play regulations). It would therefore be interesting to extend the 
resource orchestration insights in the direction of institutional entrepreneurship to assess whether 
resource acquisition and divestment strategies influence changes in the rules of the game. (R1/2) 
 
6. Conclusion 
Our study provided a number of fruitful insights with regard to resource orchestration. In 
particular, we find that managers must pay attention to the collective experience of the 
knowledge resources that they bring into a given unit. In addition, we find that although the 
release of old routines may negatively (and directly) affect performance, it can also positively 
(and indirectly) affect the performance of new routines. (R2/3) More precisely, with regard to our 
first finding, the U-shaped relationship suggests at least two implications for managers who are 
interested in human capital management. One implication concerns the contribution of 
knowledge resources as a whole and not only as the sum of individual resources. The second 
implication refers to the need to renew the human capital endowment at the firm level while 
paying attention to the experience of the newly acquired resources. Therefore, it is important to 
select and recruit newcomers characterized by substantial experience so that these knowledge 
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resources can contribute to the firm’s results in the shortest time possible. Furthermore, with 
regard to the release of co-specialized knowledge resources, our second finding suggests that the 
dismissed knowledge can be effectively substituted by new routines because such routines are 
amenable to working better when they are lightened from the burden of prior routines.  
Our study also has some implications for theory as well as for managerial practice. First, 
our study clarifies that when new knowledge resources must be added to a given unit, the 
receiving unit (i.e., a firm, a team, a division, and so on) should not be hindered by uncertainty 
with regard to the contribution of the newcomers, who must be experienced, whose professional 
background must be well known and whose competencies should be clearly recognizable. For 
example, in the context of a either a department or a research center, newcomers’ competencies 
will be effectively deployed and exploited if their previous work and publications allow a clear 
understanding of their skills. In other words, the greater the experience of newcomers is upon 
joining a new team, the lower the uncertainty that will characterize their utilization in the context 
of their new unit/firm. Future studies should investigate how previous skills and knowledge affect 
performance in settings characterized by frequent employee turnover. 
In contrast, with regard to the positive moderating effect of the release of co-specialized 
resources on the performance of current knowledge resources, we maintain that such a renewal is 
not only necessary at a given point in time but that it is also beneficial for a given team. More 
precisely, we argue that managers must make decisions that are consistent with the purpose of 
preserving a firm’s competitive advantage. Unfortunately, it is sometimes necessary for current 
knowledge resources to leave a unit/firm to allow for new knowledge resource development. 
However, although the loss of current co-specialized knowledge can damage a firm, in a parallel 
fashion, it may also help a firm develop new and less predictable competencies, thus creating an 
overall positive effect for the firm. Future studies should investigate how and to what extent this 
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type of replacement can engender positive results under different environmental and competitive 
contingencies; for example, it should be investigated whether routine replacement would exert 
the same effect in emerging industries as in mature sectors. 
In terms of managerial implications, we surmise that when managers must cope with the 
necessity of replacing current assets and resources, they should make clear choices and avoid 
compromise despite the possible fear of being perceived as too radical of a renovator. Indeed, if 
renewal is not implemented to an adequate extent, the positive effect of new knowledge resources 
on performance can be hindered and their possible contribution can remain uncertain. The most 
appropriate managerial implication, therefore, is to exploit assets and resources to achieve their 
best potential performance before they begin to show a decreasing performance trend due to 
inertia and predictability. Subsequently, we suggest replacing such resources neatly and quickly 
through the recruitment of experienced knowledge resources to preserve competitiveness and at 
the same time renew the firm’s creativity and innovativeness. 
Finally, our study also provides a methodological contribution, especially with respect to 
the analysis of potential sources of endogeneity. In particular, we have ruled out several sources 
of endogeneity via a GMM estimation model (Baum et al., 2003), through which we have 
provided further corroboration of our research hypotheses. (R2/3) 
Obviously, our study is not without limitations; however, we argue that those limitations 
represent useful directions for future research. A major limitation involves the generalizability of 
our findings to settings that are different from sports. In fact, managerial studies increasingly rely 
on sports settings to collect data and evidence whose implications are subsequently extended to 
business contexts (see Wolfe et al., 2005; Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012). (R1/3) Nevertheless, we 
maintain that further contributions to the generalizability of sports-based research could include 
extensions to contexts that are based on loose coordination among colleagues (such as 
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professional consulting firms or law firms) rather than contexts based only on tight collaboration 
among teammates. Extensions to settings where the contribution of individuals to a team is 
deemed to be more relevant than the aggregate level of knowledge of the individuals would 
provide corroborating evidence of our findings. More precisely, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether resource orchestration is also statistically and substantially significant in 
contexts where the sum of the available resources is as relevant as the whole bundle of such 
resources because such settings could demonstrate even greater significance of resource 
orchestration (i.e., managerial decision making), especially with respect to resource acquisition 
and release. Another limitation of our study is represented by the limited amount of information 
available for the individuals included in our data set. Further research, including other data about 
the knowledge resources that are the subjects of our investigation, might further corroborate and 
extend our insights.  
In summary, our study clarified that resource orchestration can affect firms’ performance to a 
substantial extent; therefore, we argue that subsequent research can address the implications 
suggested by our findings. 
 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES 
1In the context of resource orchestration, Sirmon et al. (2011) define the process of acquiring, 
accumulating and divesting resources as resource structuring. 
2As reported by Rink et al. (2013: 248), “In the USA, for example, the median duration of tenure with a 
current employer is approximately four years (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011)”.  
3 A review of this stream of literature is beyond the scope of this manuscript. For a detailed examination, 
see Argote et al. (2003) and Reagans et al. (2005).  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics & Correlations 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Performance      1.00      0.26      0.40      1.71 
           
                Lagged performance      1.07      0.22      0.67      1.71 0.618 
          
     
(0.000) 
          
New coach      0.59      0.49      0.00      1.00 -0.282 -0.332 
         
     
(0.000) (0.000) 
         Coach’s absolute 
experience      4.77      4.22      1.00     23.00 0.153 0.119 -0.186 
        
     
(0.000) (0.015) (0.000) 
        
Historic aspiration level     -7.70      3.34    -15.75     -1.00 0.669 0.800 -0.154 0.180 
       
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
       
Team quality      7.00      3.88      0.00     15.00 0.508 0.589 -0.345 0.234 0.608 
      
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      Released employees’ 
quality     84.72     65.47      0.00    375.89 0.255 0.287 -0.035 0.201 0.410 0.198 
     
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.474) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     New employees’ 
experience      3.31      0.94     -1.79      5.30 0.163 0.045 -0.038 0.225 0.127 0.366 0.185 
    
     
(0.000) (0.369) (0.390) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
    New employees’ 
experience squared     11.82      5.40      0.00     28.09 0.220 0.070 -0.053 0.237 0.140 0.392 0.205 0.955 
   
     
(0.000) (0.160) (0.238) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   Released employees’ co-
specialization       7.42      5.03      0.09     35.76 -0.354 -0.399 0.313 -0.115 -0.300 -0.517 0.001 -0.033 -0.054   
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.980) (0.472) (0.238) 
  Team-level co-
specialization     22.31      5.34      6.28     41.22 0.360 0.215 -0.097 0.158 0.202 0.033 0.105 0.134 0.179 0.069 
 
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.453) (0.031) (0.003) (0.000) (0.127) 
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Table 2 
Results of Panel Data Regressiona 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Performance Performance Performance Performance 
Lagged performance 0.320** 0.364** 0.267* 0.299* 
 (0.107) (0.130) (0.108) (0.122) 
Two-year lagged performance 0.225** 0.245*** 0.156** 0.169** 
 (0.0671) (0.0660) (0.0566) (0.0555) 
 
New coach 
 
-0.0357 
 
-0.0349 
 
-0.0303 
 
-0.0278 
 (0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0247) (0.0245) 
     
Coach’s absolute experience  
-0.00251 
 
-0.00254 
 
-0.00303 
 
-0.00289 
 (0.00306) (0.00299) (0.00323) (0.00316) 
     
Historic aspiration level -0.0244+ -0.0231 -0.0239+ -0.0239+ 
 (0.0139) (0.0145) (0.0122) (0.0123) 
     
Team quality 0.00301 -0.00434 0.00514 0.00189 
 (0.00551) (0.00718) (0.00431) (0.00599) 
     
Released employees’ quality -0.000362+ -0.000343 -0.000160 -0.000157 
 (0.000207) (0.000216) (0.000160) (0.000165) 
     
New employees’ 
experience 
  
-0.126** 
  
-0.0967** 
  (0.0397)  (0.0338) 
     
New employees’ 
experience squared 
  
0.0254*** 
  
0.0169* 
  (0.00658)  (0.00629) 
     
Released employees’ co-
specialization 
   
-0.0235* 
 
-0.0265* 
   (0.01000) (0.0107) 
     
Team-level co-specialization   0.0100* 0.00781 
   (0.00488) (0.00511) 
     
Released employees’ co-
specialization * Team-level co-
specialization  
   
0.000834+ 
 
0.000943+ 
   (0.000470) (0.000484) 
     
_cons 0.358 0.514+ 0.313 0.475+ 
 (0.243) (0.282) (0.222) (0.246) 
R2 0.180 0.222 0.302 0.317 
N 346 335 346 335 
a. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
b. Results for year dummy variables are available upon request. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3 
Results of the Dynamic Panel Data Analysis Controlling for Endogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Performance Performance Performance Performance 
Lagged performance -0.00519 0.0634 0.0313 -0.0204 
 (0.137) (0.172) (0.135) (0.169) 
     
Two-year lagged performance 0.197* 0.199+ 0.112 0.0814 
 (0.0870) (0.104) (0.0810) (0.0908) 
     
New coach -0.0347 -0.0403+ -0.0374 -0.0433 
 (0.0247) (0.0235) (0.0249) (0.0266) 
     
Coach’s absolute experience -0.00173 -0.00106 -0.00500 -0.00273 
 (0.00710) (0.00759) (0.00605) (0.00675) 
     
Historic aspiration level 0.0585** 0.0504* 0.0189 0.0228 
 (0.0201) (0.0251) (0.0234) (0.0272) 
     
Team quality -0.00373 -0.0131 0.0172 0.0140 
 (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0129) (0.0118) 
     
Released employees’ quality -0.000515+ -0.000318 0.0000632 0.000124 
 (0.000263) (0.000295) (0.000322) (0.000362) 
     
     
New employees’ 
experience 
 -0.191**  -0.116 
  (0.0694)  (0.0747) 
     
New employees’ 
experience squared 
 0.0428**  0.0220 
  (0.0150)  (0.0153) 
     
Released employees’ co-
specialization 
  -0.0421* -0.0396* 
   (0.0187) (0.0197) 
     
Team-level co-specialization   0.00671 0.00645 
   (0.00675) (0.00670) 
     
Released employees’  
co-specialization  
* Team-level co-specialization 
  0.00151+ 0.00131 
   (0.000885) (0.000913) 
     
_cons 1.412*** 1.403** 0.870* 1.123* 
 (0.375) (0.489) (0.409) (0.502) 
N 346 335 346 335 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Tests available upon request. 
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Appendix A List of football teams included in the dataset 
 
1. Ascoli; 2. Atalanta; 3. Avellino; 4. Bari; 5. Bologna; 6. Brescia; 7. Cagliari; 8. Catania; 9. 
Catanzaro; 10. Cesena; 11. Como; 12. Cremonese; 13. Empoli; 14. Fiorentina; 15. Foggia; 16. 
Genoa; 17. Internazionale; 18. Juventus; 19. L.R. Vicenza; 20. Lazio; 21. Lecce; 22. Lecco; 23. 
Mantova; 24. Messina; 25. Milan; 26. Modena; 27. Napoli; 28. Padova; 29. Palermo; 30. Parma; 
31. Perugia; 32. Pescara; 33. Pisa; 34. Pistoiese; 35. Roma; 36. Sampdoria; 37. Spal; 38. Ternana; 
39. Torino; 40. Udinese; 41. Varese; 42. Venezia; 43. Verona 
 
 
Appendix B Sample Calculation of Individual and Team Quality 
Individual Player Quality  
∑
(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑑 )𝑡−1 × (team’s total points )𝑡−1
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
𝑁−1
𝑡=1
 
We calculate new employees’ quality at the team level as the average of the individual quality for 
the new players on each team at the end of the previous season to attenuate reverse causality.  
Example 
In this example, we calculate new employees’ quality for the team Roma in the 1979-80 season. 
Suppose – for the sake of the example – that Roma’s orchestration strategy consists of three new 
players, A, B, and C, who, before joining Roma, played in Serie A in the amounts reported 
below. 
Individual quality of player A: [(30*27/24)+(25*35/25)+(20*37/26)+(28*44/27)]= 142.84 
Player Season  Team  Number of 
matches played 
Team’s points at 
the end of the 
season 
Age 
A 1975-76 Fiorentina 30 27 24 
 1976-77 Fiorentina 25 35 25 
 1977-78 Milan 20 37 26 
 1978-79 Milan 28 44 27 
      
B 1976-77 Napoli 28 28 18 
 1977-78 Napoli 30 19 19 
 1978-79 Bologna 24 24 20 
      
C 1978-79 Verona 30 15 18 
43 
 
Individual quality of player B: [(28*28/18)+(30*19/19)+(24*24/20)]= 102,36 
Individual quality of player C: (30*15/18)=25 
Because Roma decided to acquire players A, B, and C, its new employees’ quality equals 
(142.84+102.36+25)/3=270. 2 
By using this approach to measure individual player quality, we obtain the following highest 
ranked 30 players over the time window of our study (i.e., between the 1960-61 and 1991-92 
seasons).  
1. RIVERA Gianni (M) 11. CAUSIO Franco (F) 21. MORINI Francesco (D) 
2. FACCHETTI Giacinto (D) 12. ALTAFINI Jose' (F) 22. CUCCUREDDU Ant. (D) 
3. BURGNICH Tarcisio (D) 13. GALLI Giovanni (G) 23. PULICI Paolino (F) 
4. CORSO Mario (F) 14. ROSATO Roberto (D) 24. BETTEGA Roberto (F) 
5. ZOFF Dino (G) 15. FURINO Giuseppe (M) 25. GUARNERI Aristide (D) 
6. MAZZOLA Sandro (F) 16. BERGOMI Giuseppe (D) 26. FERRINI Giorgio (D) 
7. ALBERTOSI Enrico (G) 17. BULGARELLI Giac. (M) 27. DOMENGHINI Angelo (F) 
8. DE SISTI Giancarlo (M) 18. BARESI Franco (D) 28. VIERI Lido (G) 
9. SCIREA Gaetano (D) 19. PECCI Eraldo (M) 29. ANASTASI Pietro (F) 
10. SALVADORE Sandro (D) 20. GENTILE Claudio (D) 30. LODETTI Giovanni (M) 
G= goalkeeper; D=defender; M=midfielder; F=forward 
To further validate our measure, as a proxy for players’ quality, we also counted the number of 
games played (caps) with Italy’s national team during the time span of our study. Taking into 
account the role of specialization, i.e., only one player per single role can be bundled in the 
starting lineup, and considering that the national team plays only a few games per year, the 
overall national team game-presence ranking is consistent with the above reported quality 
ranking (data available from the authors upon request).  
We find only a few exceptions to our results that are associated with highly skilled players who 
either had a shorter career (i.e., a lower number of games played) or who spent part of their career 
with lower-level teams. Included among these players are Paolo Rossi, who played in Serie A for 
only 8 years because of knee injuries and a 2-year ban due to an illegal betting scandal and who 
spent the first half of his career with minor teams such as Como, Vicenza and Perugia; and Gigi 
Riva, who had two major leg injuries, and who also spent his entire career with Cagliari, a minor 
team, which, nevertheless, he led to the Serie A championship in 1969-70.  
 
 
 
